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PLEADING
APPEALABILITY OF A DECLARATORY JUDGMENT
In the recent case of Dillon v. Gaker, 57 Ohio App. 90, 25 Ohio
L. Abs. 282, io Ohio Op. 130 (i937), the plaintiff sought a declara-
tion under the Ohio declaratory judgments statute, Ohio Gen. Code,
Sections 12102-I to 12102-15, as to whether a restriction contained in
a deed which was set forth in written contract was enforceable. If said
restriction was found to be enforceable, it would determine the right to
maintain a mandatory injunction, if a violation of this restriction was
attempted. The construction of the written contract is the matter pri-
marily involved. The majoriy of the court held that since the causes
set forth had always been cognizable in chancery the case was appeal-
able on both questions of law and fact. The theory behind this opinion
being that, as the primary matters of the litigation were cognizable in
chancery, it was a chancery case and appealable as such. The majority
opinion approves and follows two earlier Ohio appeals cases, Kochs v.
Koch$, 49 Ohio App. 327, 197 N.E. 255 (I935); and Kresge Co. v.
B.D.K. Co., 52 Ohio App. 101, 3 N.E. (2d) 529, 6 Ohio Op. 236
('935)-
The dissenting judge is of the opinion, "that such a special statutory
proceeding, unknown to the chancery courts, can not under any circum-
stances, regardless of the character of the relief sought, be a chancery
case." The dissent is thus based upon the argument that declaratory
judgments were not within the jurisdiction of chancery prior to the
statute, and therefore as the new remedy was created solely by the
statute, it can be appealable only on questions of law for it is not a
chancery case within Art. IV, Sec. 6 of the Constitution of Ohio.
The controversy between the majority and dissenting opinions is
based on the question whether the character of the relief sought in a
given complaint determines the appealability of the statutory declaratory
judgment, or, whether such a remedy historically was inherent to equit-
able jurisprudence. On closer analysis it appears that the character of
relief sought in every declaratory judgment proceeding is to "declare
the existence of a jural relation, i.e. some right, privilege, power or
immunity in the plaintiff, or some duty, no-right, liability, or disability
in the defendant." Borchard, "The Declaratory Judgment," 28 Yale
Law Jour. 1, 5. It is submitted that the solution of the appealability of
the statutory declaratory judgment will be found in the answer to the
question: Is a declaratory judgment a chancery case?
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It is quite generally recognized that there was no jurisdiction either
in law or equity to render a merely declaratory judgment without'
awarding any remedial process prior to the statutes authorizing declara-
tory judgments. 33 Corpus Jur. 1097. It is true that, incidental to
other relief, declarations and constructions could be made by courts of
chancery. That, however, is a vastly different jurisdiction than the type
of declaratory judgment rendered under the statutory declaratory judg-
ment remedy. Construction of written instruments for the mere in-
formation of the parties, disconnected from some executory equitable
relief, would not be granted by the chancery courts prior to the statutes.
Bevans v. Bevans, 69 N.J. Eq. I (1905). It was the decree in chan-
cery, not the declaration of rights, that was effective in granting relief.
Regardless of the clarifying effect of such declaration, it had no value
if its principle could not be carried into effect by decree. Woods v.
Fuller, 61 Md. 457 (1884). Such a decree was not within the juris-
diction of chancery. Chipman v. Montgomery, 63 N.Y. 221 (1875);
Bussy v. McKie, 2 S.C. McCord Eq. 23, 16 Am. Dec. 628 (1827);
Hart v. Darter, 107 Va. 310, 38 S.E. 590 (1907); In re John, 30
Ore. 494, 47 Pac. 341 (1896); and Pomeroy, Eq. Jur. 1156.
In England, where one should look to see the true original limita-
tions of equity's jurisprudence, it was said "in equity a declaration of
rights was never granted unless there was some relief that could be
given." Baxter v. London County Council, 63 L.T.R. 767 (1890).
Lord Brougham in Earl of Mansfield v. Stewart, 5 Bell 139, 16o
(1846), expressed an envy of Scottish jurisprudence that allowed the
"beneficial and most admirably contrived form of proceeding called a
declaratory action." He lamented that in England there was no anal-
ogy. The English view was set forth in Guaranty Trust Co. v. Hannay
& Co., 2 K.B. 536, 12 A.L.R. I (915), that no right to a declara-
tory judgment existed, except as incidental to other consequential relief
prior to the English declaratory judgment statutes. See Lawrence,
Equitable Jurisprudence, p. 988.
"Declaratory judgments were not recognized in Ohio generally
until the new Probate Code went into effect," Wagner v. Schrembs,
44 Ohio App. 44, 184 N.E. 292 (1932). In certain instances equity,
in the absence of statute, did render declaratory judgments, Wiswell v.
First Cong. Church, 14 Ohio St. 31 (1862); Bowen v. Bowen, 38
Ohio St. 426 (1882), but only as incidental to other relief.
In spite of the foregoing conclusion against the equitable jurisdiction
over declaratory judgments and while the general rule was as stated by
Ross, J., that declaratory judgments were not rendered by chancery
prior to the statutes, nevertheless there have been found sporadic instances
where chancery granted a form of declaratory relief not incidental to
any corrective relief. Thus in Greenough v. Greenough, 284 I1. 416,
12o N.E. 272 (I918), while the court held it lacked jurisdiction to
construe a will, it actually made a declaration of the rights of the parties
in telling why it would not make the construction requested. In Bankers
Surety Co. v. Meyer, 205 N.Y. 219, 98 N.E. 399 (1912), which is
one of the strongest instances of chancery making a declaratory decree,
certain notes made by the decedent and which his executor rejected
because they were not due, were declared to be valid claims against the
estate. This was a true declaratory judgment rendered by chancery in
the absence of statute. Another court of chancery construed a will with-
out holding as a prerequisite that there be a trust involved. Haseltine v.
Sheperd, 99 Me. 495, 59 Ad. 1025 (1905).
In certain other classes of cases the relief decreed in some respects
resembles declaratory relief. For example, instructions respecting the
management of trust estates given to trustees has always been cognizable
in chancery. It is believed that in the trust field is found the only gener-
ally recognized instance of this power of chancery to declare by its
decree. This declaratory right is severely restricted to trusts, which
always fell within chancery jurisdiction. Donohoe v. Rogers, 168 Cal.
700, 144 Pac. 958 (1914); Porten v. Peterson, 139 Minn. 152, i66
N.W. 183 (1918). In interpleader cases where the conflicting claims
to ownership of property or funds in the hands of a stakeholder exist,
the proceeding at the instance of the stakeholder is in some respects
similar to a declaratory judgment. There the decree declares that the
applicant is relieved of all liability. The equitable action for the removal
of cloud on tide so far as it does not direct cancellation of any instrument
or other cloud, is merely a declaration of the plaintiffs tide, in effect a
declaratory decree. Likewise in regard to boundary disputes, chancery
has had jurisdiction from time immemorial to declare the rights of the
parties. Boone v. Robinson, 151 Ky. 715, 152 S.W. 753 (1913); and
Krause v. Note, 217 Ill. 298, 75 N.E. 362 (1905).
While the foregoing instances afford some authority for the conten-
tion that an inherent equitable jurisdiction to render declaratory judg-
ments existed prior to the statutes, it is submitted that, except in the
cases of the trusts and the bills to remove cloud on tide, the instances
are spasmodic and desultory and do not afford a sufficient basis for the
general conclusion that declaratory judgments were cognizable in
chancery.
The very fact that legislation was thought to be necessary to create
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this remedy shows that due to the lack of remedy both at common law
and chancery, and due to the great demand for such a remedy, the
statutes were enacted. In the case of In re Ungaro, 88 N.J. Eq. 25,
IO2 Ad. 244 (1917), the court of chancery admitted it would have
been unable to construe wills and other written instruments prior to the
statute but that now such a declaratory remedy was available.
In the principal case the dissenting opinion is apparently well sup-
ported by authority in its position that the declaratory judgment was
purely a creature of statute and not within the inherent jurisdiction of
chancery. It is well settled in Ohio that the question of the appealability
of a case depends upon whether the basic principle of the statute is
equitable in character and based upon some equitable doctrine. Harper
& Kirschten Shoe Co. v. The S. & B. Shoe Co., 16 Ohio App. 387
(1922). Clearly the basic principle and character of the declaratory
judgment statute is not equitable. Therefore the declaratory judgment
is not a chancery case and can not be appealed on both questions of
law and fact.
To have the appellate review of the declaratory judgment on law
alone will in no manner harm the effectiveness of the declaratory judg-
ment remedy or do violence to any sound principle of policy. On the
contrary it will better serve the declaratory judgment, the aim of which
is speed and simplicity in securing the relief sought, by avoiding a trial
de novo on appeal thus securing greater dispatch in the final disposition
of the litigation.
KARL RUEDIGER
REAL PROPERTY
LAND TRUST CERTIFICATES
The testatrix, Frances Helen Rawson, transferred personal property
to a trustee. With her consent and approval, a part of the income was
invested in certain "land trust" certificates. At her death, these formed
a part of the estate and the question was whether they passeed by the
will to the devisees of the real estate or to the legatees of the personal
property. The court, construing the will and declaring the rights of
certain beneficiaries, held the certificates passed as real estate to the
devisees named in the will. The judgment was affirmed by the Court
of Appeals. The First NatI. Bank, Exr., v. Davis, 56 Ohio App. 388,
9 Ohio Op. 443 (1937).
Land trust certificates are a comparatively recent development of
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